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Abstract:  
This study uses data from the 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation to examine how welfare policies and local economic conditions contribute to women’s transitions 
into and out of female headship and into and out of welfare participation. It also examines whether welfare 
participation is directly associated with longer spells of headship. The study employs a simultaneous hazards 
approach that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in all of its transition models and for the endogeneity of 
welfare participation in its headship model. The estimation results indicate that welfare participation 
significantly reduces the chances of leaving female headship. The estimates also reveal that more generous 
welfare benefits do not directly contribute to headship but rather contribute indirectly to headship by increasing 
the chances that a mother will enter welfare and consequently remain a single mother for longer. More generous 
Earned Income Tax Credit benefits are associated with more stable arrangements for both headship and welfare 
participation. Other measures of welfare policies, including indicators for the adoption of welfare waivers and 
the implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families programs, are generally not significantly 
associated with headship or welfare receipt. Better economic opportunities are estimated to increase headship 
but reduce welfare participation among unmarried mothers. 




Policy makers have long expressed concern over the linkage between welfare use and family structure. In the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Congress and the 
President sought to change public assistance policies so that they would not only promote economic self-
sufficiency but also support marriage and discourage single parenthood. In the current proposals to reauthorize 
PRWORA, family structure has become even more central. 
 
Researchers, too, have been keenly interested in understanding how welfare policies affect demographic 
outcomes including births, marriages and living arrangements. The studies in this area have generally examined 
reduced-form associations between policies and demographic behaviors. Few of the studies on demographic 
outcomes have considered how policies might operate through welfare participation or how participation might 
directly affect demographic behavior. The chief difficulty in such an analysis is that welfare participation and 
family structure are both endogenous variables. An analysis of the direct relationship between welfare 
participation and family structure must account for unobserved factors that might contribute to both outcomes. 
Reduced-form strategies sidestep this thorny issue. 
 
In this article, we estimate transition models into and out of female headship and into and out of welfare 
participation that allow unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated among the various transitions. We further 
allow the transition out of female headship to directly depend on welfare participation status, thereby estimating 
a structural direct effect. We thus address whether being on welfare directly reduces the likelihood that a 
women leaves headship (which would be primarily by marriage) after properly controlling for individual 
heterogeneity. We employ Lillard’s (1993) simultaneous hazard approach to estimate the model using 
individual-level data from the 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP). These data are augmented by contextual data on state-level welfare policies, state and 
Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) policies, and county-level labor and marriage market conditions. Our 
empirical analysis reveals that participating in welfare reduces the chance of leaving female headship and that 
welfare policies affect headship through program participation. 
 
Background and significance 
Concern among policymakers and the public about rising rates of female headship in the US is not without 
foundation. Female-headed families tend to have higher poverty rates and more welfare usage than two- parent 
families (Lerman 1996). Children raised in female-headed families typically have worse 
schooling/developmental outcomes than those raised in two-parent families (Haveman & Wolfe 1994; 
McLanahan & Sandefur 1994).
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 Welfare reform legislation and its emphasis on encouraging two-parent 
families is a manifestation of this concern. 
 
A large literature has developed concerning the impact of welfare programs on demographic decisions that give 
rise to female headship. In an influential book, Murray (1984) argued that public assistance programs were 
responsible for the growth in female headship. Murray pointed out that single parents were categorically eligible 
for AFDC, whereas married parents were generally ineligible. By subsidizing one family arrangement but not 
others, AFDC provided unambiguous incentives to become and remain a single parent. Subsequent changes in 
policies have reduced these incentives but have not eliminated them. The Family Support Act of 1998 required 
all states to offer AFDC-Unemployed Parent programs for married-couple families. These programs extended 
eligibility to two-parent families but required the primary earner to work less than 100 hours per month and 
have a recent history of work. The PRWORA allowed states to relax these requirements further; the TANF 
programs in 33 states now make no distinction between single-parent and married-couple families and base 
eligibility solely on financial considerations (Gardiner et al. 2002). 
 
While the incentive effects of the old AFDC program seemed clear, there was considerable disagreement 
regarding the size of these effects. Time series evidence undercuts Murray’s thesis regarding the centrality of 
public assistance policies. When adjusted for inflation, cash assistance has become less, not more, generous 
since the mid-1970s. If anything, this should have contributed to a decline, rather than a rise in headship. 
 
Subsequent empirical research on the linkage between welfare benefits and family structure has been equivocal 
about the magnitude of effects. Moffitt (1998) reviewed a large number of studies on the impact of welfare 
benefit levels on fertility and marriage and concluded that welfare encouraged fertility and discouraged 
marriage, but that the sizes of the effects were likely small. Others have also surveyed the literature on 
marriage, cohabitation, fertility and divorce and reached similar conclusions (Acs 1995; Hoynes 1997b; Moffitt 
1995, 2001; Ribar 1998). 
 
Researchers have analyzed both experimental and observational evidence to investigate the impact of welfare 
programs on demographic outcomes. Most of the experimental evidence comes from states that conducted 
random-assignment evaluations of changes in welfare rules granted under program waivers. Although these 
evaluations were not primarily designed to investigate demographic impacts, they can provide very powerful 
evidence because they address problems of selectivity and policy endogeneity. Analyses of the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program by Knox et al. (2000) and Gennetian & Knox (2004) indicated that the program 
increased marriage and reduced divorce among participants. However, these appear to be isolated results. A 
meta analysis by Gennetian & Knox (2003) of waiver experiments in different states showed little consistent 
evidence of demographic effects. An analysis of a Canadian experiment by Harknett & Gennetian (2003) also 
produced inconclusive findings. 
 
Observational studies have been able to examine the relationship between welfare policies and demographic 
outcomes using more general populations and across more varied environments. Schoeni & Blank (2000), 
Horvath-Rose & Peters (2001) and Bitler et al. (2004) have investigated the impacts of welfare using aggregate 
or state-level data and found effects of policies. A drawback to using aggregate data is that they suffer from 
composition effects whereby it is difficult to properly condition on individual traits. Aggregate studies also 
cannot control for duration effects. 
 
A host of studies, including Blank (1999), Blank & Ruggles (1996), Fitzgerald (1995), Gittleman (2001), 
Klerman & Haider (forthcoming), and Ribar (2004), have used individual-level data to estimate models of 
welfare transitions. In their surveys of the literature, Blank (2002) and Moffitt (2002) have reported that most 
studies show that welfare benefits and labor market conditions have an impact on time spent on welfare. But the 
studies do not jointly consider female headship. Studies that consider family structure transitions such as Moffitt 
& Rendell (1995), Bitler et al. (2004), and Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004) do not jointly model welfare 
participation. In this paper we jointly model the two decisions. 
 
Discrete choice models of demographic decisions and welfare have been used to jointly model the 
marriage/fertility and welfare choice. Duncan & Hoffman (1990) found little effect of benefit levels on births 
for black teens, and Hoffman & Duncan (1995) found little effect of benefits on divorce. Rosensweig (1999) 
found that higher AFDC benefits substantially increased the probability of a non-martial birth for low income 
women. His model allowed choices among three states – unmarried and childless, unmarried and with children, 
and married – and allowed for unobserved correlations in the utility in each state. He did not model the direct 
effect of participation in welfare. 
 
Keane & Wolpin (2002) estimated a structural dynamic lifetime model that included welfare participation, 
fertility, marriage, work and school attendance using data from the NLSY79. They reported that welfare 
benefits had significant impacts on welfare participation, work and schooling decisions, but no significant effect 
on fertility and marriage decisions. 
 
More closely related to our work, Teitler et al. (2003) have recently undertaken a preliminary analysis of the 
direct relationship between welfare participation and spells of unmarried motherhood. Their analysis followed 
mothers from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing study who were unmarried at the time of their 
children’s births and estimated hazard models of the women’s transitions into marriage. The models 
distinguished between women who were imputed to be eligible or ineligible for TANF as well as those who 
reported participating or not participating in the program. Their preliminary results, which did not account for 
the endogeneity of eligibility and participation, indicated that welfare participation was not strongly associated 
with marriage. 
 
The endogeneity of the welfare participation decision could occur because unobserved characteristics of women 
prone to participate in welfare may also make them less likely to marry. Without proper controls for this 
heterogeneity, the unobserved characteristics could induce a spurious correlation between welfare use and 
headship transitions. 
 
Our article extends the literature by using individual-level longitudinal data in a joint model of welfare and 
headship transitions. We allow these transitions to be linked by unobserved heterogeneity in a simultaneous 
hazard model. Furthermore, we allow headship transitions to depend directly on welfare participation. We 
estimate the impacts of welfare benefits, welfare waiver adoption and TANF adoption, and the EITC. Moffitt 
(1995, 1998) and others have noted that studies of welfare effects on demographic changes must be careful to 
control for the economic and policy environment across states so that welfare impacts do not become 
confounded with other changes. In this article we control for skill-specific county-level measures of the labor 
market and county- level marriage market variables to address these concerns. 
 
Conceptual model 
The empirical and conceptual analyses distinguish between women who are and are not single heads of families 
and women who do and do not participate in welfare. While these simplifications make the models much easier 
to work with, they also abstract from some relevant detail. Consider the routes into and out of headship. Women 
become female heads of families by bearing children out of wedlock or by dissolving marriages that have 
produced or include children. Mothers leave headship by marrying, having their children grow up, or having 
their children move out of the household. The relevant component behaviors regarding fertility, marriage and 
household structure can themselves be further broken down. For instance, a birth results from a series of 
outcomes involving sexual activity, contraception, completing a pregnancy, and keeping the child. The decision 
to marry follows some type of search activity and requires a corresponding decision from a partner. 
 
Welfare participation also involves a complex set of processes. Families must apply for benefits and then be 
determined to be eligible. Eligible families who choose to take up benefits must further decide whether and how 
much to work, how to comply with program rules, and which services to receive. The potential interactions 
between the component processes of female headship and welfare participation are innumerable. Our 
conceptual analysis describes some of the reasons why such interactions arise, but it is far from exhaustive. 
More comprehensive theoretical discussions can be found in the articles by Blank & Ruggles (1996), Hoynes 
(1997a, b), Matthews et al. (1997), Peters et al. (2003) & Gennetian & Knox (2003). 
 
Following Becker (1981), we examine female headship in a rational- choice framework. We also consider 
welfare participation in the same framework. The key assumptions of the rational-choice approach are that 
people evaluate how alternative decisions affect their well-being and choose actions that maximize their 
perceived well-being. Thus, a woman would become a single parent at a point in time if that outcome provides 
more expected lifetime utility than other family arrangements, including marriage or remaining childless. In 
making her decision, a woman would compare the immediate costs and rewards of single parenthood with the 
costs and rewards of the alternatives. She would also evaluate how the decision squares with her long-term 
interests. Decisions regarding welfare receipt would follow a similar calculus; mothers would participate in 
welfare if they perceive that it is their best interest to do so. 
 
Without question, welfare participation affects the resources available to single mothers. The old AFDC 
program provided benefits to single mothers but not to married mothers or childless women. Thus, it created 
immediate incentives to become a single mother. Over the longer term, the incentives were less clear. On the 
one hand, the program could be viewed as subsidizing marital search and allowing women to be choosier 
regarding potential spouses. This would have also contributed to higher rates of headship. On the other hand, 
more selective searching could lead to better matches and more stable marriages. Or the availability of welfare 
could reduce the risk associated with a bad match. In addition, welfare participation itself might reduce 
marriage because, when looking ahead to marriage, the participants forgo the expected future benefits but non-
participants forgo these same benefits net of the fixed cost and stigma cost of establishing benefits. Hence, 
marriage has a higher opportunity cost for current welfare participants. 
 
The AFDC-UP and TANF programs, which are still conditioned on the presence of children, continue to 
provide incentives to become a parent. However, because they provide resources to both married and unmarried 
parents, the incentives for single parenthood are less clear. To the extent that the programs place more hurdles 
in front of married- couple families than single-parent families, they would create incentives to become a single 
parent. The incentives, however, would be milder than under the old AFDC program. Even if explicit hurdles 
are not present, it might be more difficult for married couples to qualify financially. This would be especially 
true of dual-earner couples. 
 
By a similar logic, changes in welfare benefits or program rules would affect the value of participating in the 
program and alter the resources available to different types of families. Thus, changes in welfare policy 
variables, such as reductions in benefits, the imposition of family caps or time limits, or requirements to work, 
could affect female headship directly through welfare participation and indirectly through effects on potential 
future receipt. 
 
The rational-choice framework also indicates that other variables will affect headship and welfare participation 
decisions. Labor market conditions would seem to be especially relevant. A woman living in an area with good 
job opportunities can expect higher earnings in both the married and unmarried states. Better earnings 
opportunities for women might reduce marriage through an “independence effect.” Such an effect would arise if 
married women keep only a portion of an earnings increase while single women get to keep all of an increase. 
An independence effect would also occur if higher earnings subsidized marital search by single women. Higher 
earnings and employment could also change the probabilities of marriage by increasing women’s bargaining 
power within marriage, increasing their exposure to employed men, or simply making them more financially 
attractive as potential spouses. Complicating this, better economic opportunities would also likely translate into 
higher male wages, which would raise the quality of marriage prospects and the possibility of marrying. 
Furthermore, higher wages and employment are likely to affect fertility by increasing the opportunity cost of 
having children but also increasing the resources available to raise them. Thus, higher wages and better 
employment prospects will have ambiguous effects on female headship; empirical research is needed to sort out 
the impacts. 
 
The EITC also has ambiguous effects on marriage, as noted by Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999). For single 
mothers with low earnings, the EITC can provide extra incentive to marry a man with earnings. For mothers 
with more earnings who already receive the EITC, the added income of a spouse could reduce or eliminate the 
EITC payment. 
 
The effects of economic opportunities on welfare participation seem more clear cut because eligibility and 
benefit levels are both conditioned on incomes. What is less certain is whether the reforms initiated under 
waivers and then TANF policies strengthened or weakened this relationship. Higher earnings disregards and 
reduced benefit reduction rates in some states have made work and welfare more compatible. Indeed, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (2003) reported that almost 60% of TANF families in 2000 included 
at least one worker. At the same time, however, time limits may have made mothers more reluctant to 
participate in welfare and receive reduced benefits during periods when work is available. Women in these 
circumstances may prefer to “bank” their benefits as insurance against leaner times (Grogger 2003). While we 




Data preparation is divided into three tasks. We first use individual- level data on women from the SIPP to 
construct spells of headship and non-headship and spells of welfare participation and non-participation. These 
data also provide information on other personal and background characteristics of the women. Second, we 
augment this information with data on welfare policies and EITC benefits based on each woman’s state of 
residence. Third, we add contextual variables about labor and marriage market conditions in the woman’s 
county of residence. We restrict our sample to women aged 15-55. 
 
Individual data from SIPP 
We pool data from the 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels of SIPP. These data span the calendar period October 
1989 to February 2000. This is an opportune period in which to observe behavioral responses to policy. During 
the 1990s states modified their welfare programs by obtaining waivers from the federal rules governing their 
programs. Many of these changes were incorporated into the 1996 PRWORA, though this bill also affected 
states that had not adopted waivers. In addition to the dramatic changes in welfare policies, the EITC was also 
adjusted substantially over this period. 
 
The SIPP includes detailed information on individual and family demographic characteristics as well as the use 
of government transfer programs. The SIPP is a national survey that oversamples low-income households, but is 
nationally representative when weighted by survey weights. The respondents are interviewed every four months 
and asked about monthly activities during the prior four months. These 4-month interview periods are called 
waves. The panels vary in length from 32 to 48 months and vary in size from roughly 20,000 to 40,000 
households. This large number of individuals gives us a sizable number of transitions even though the panels 
are fairly short. 
 
The units of analysis in our empirical analysis are spells of female headship and non-headship and spells of 
welfare receipt and non-receipt. We define a female head of family as a woman who is unmarried and living 
with related children aged 17 or less. Our definition of female heads excludes married women with absent 
spouses but includes women in cohabiting relationships. Both of these cases are ambiguous because the 
contributions of the partners are not clear. We also include mothers who are heads of subfamilies. A narrower 
focus on female household heads would introduce an additional residential location component into the 
analysis. We define an indicator for headship and then compute spells of headship and non-headship based on 
the entire monthly sequence of headship indicators during course of the panel. Spells of headship and non-
headship are mutually exclusive but possibly alternately repeating. That is, an individual woman could be 
observed to make multiple transitions into and out of headship and could contribute several spells to our 
analysis. 
 
We include only spells of headship or non-headship that begin during the panel, that is, those that are 
uncensored or only right- censored. Although the SIPP contains retrospective information that can be used to 
construct a woman’s entire headship history, it lacks retrospective information on many of the time-varying 
explanatory variables, particularly residence of children. It was not computationally feasible to account for these 
missing data. While excluding left censored spells leads to considerable sample loss, it correctly produces a 
sample of new spells to which our results apply. Several previous dynamic studies, including those by Blank & 
Ruggles (1996), Fitzgerald (1995) and Gittleman (2001), have also excluded left-censored spells. 
 
We construct spells of welfare participation and non-participation in a similar way based on the monthly data. 
We define a woman as a participant if she receives AFDC or TANF income as the unmarried head of a family 
or subfamily unit. Conceivably, welfare spells could be defined independently of female headship. However, 
eligibility is conditioned on parenthood; so, the analysis would need to distinguish between different types of 
“non-heads.” Also, there are not enough participating married families in the SIPP to support an empirical 
analysis. Because of this restriction, we do not examine participation in the Unemployed Parent programs of 
AFDC and TANF. Spells of welfare receipt or non-receipt that are on-going at the start of a headship spell are 
artificially left-censored at that point. Similarly, spells of welfare receipt, or non-receipt that are observed to 
continue after a woman exits headship are artificially right-censored. Within a given headship spell, there may 
be a single spell of welfare receipt or non- receipt or multiple spells on and off welfare. 
 
In addition to the demographic and welfare information used to construct spell histories, the SIPP provides 
personal information such as age, race, and education, and whether the women lives in a metropolitan area. 
 
The SIPP also provides information on geographic residence. We need residence information to assign values 
for welfare policy and labor and marriage market conditions, all of which vary by location and time. The public 
use version of the SIPP does not release county of residence nor does it fully report state of residence or MSA 
in order to preserve respondent confidentiality. To separate out the impact of welfare rule changes and labor and 
marriage market changes, we desire county of residence data so that we can use county variation to isolate labor 
market and marriage market effects. By special arrangement, we obtained permission to use the 
internal/confidential versions of the census files that reported county and state of residence. (The work was 
done at the US Census Bureau Boston Research Data Center and the Center for Economic Studies in 
Washington, DC. The results have been screened to insure that no confidential data are revealed and approved 
for release.) This permitted us to match in detailed contextual data. 
 
Table 1 provides information about the characteristics of individuals in the top panel (a) followed by 
characteristics of spells in the bottom panel (b). We started with 88,419 women in the SIPP who were ever 
observed to be in the age range 15–54 and who ever reported any information on their headship or welfare 
histories. Of these, we could construct continuous, though possibly censored, spells with the necessary 
explanatory variables for 60,155 women. From this group, there were 12,685 women with at least one non-left-
censored headship or non- headship spell. Thus, we lose about four-fifths of the available sample in the SIPP by 
dropping left-censored spells. 
 
Our final sample of 12,865 women experienced 3,643 headship spells, 10,511 non-headship spells, 923 welfare 
participation spells, and 3,373 non-participation spells. Most of these spells are right censored. Previ- 
 
ous estimates by Bumpass & Raley (1995) and Moffitt and Rendall (1995) indicated that the average length of 
headship spells was 3–4 years for whites and roughly 12 years for blacks; the high degree of right censoring in 
the SIPP is consistent with this. The non-headship spells in our sample are by younger individuals with less 
education because many of those spells begin with a woman aged 15. Welfare participants tend to be younger 
and less educated than non-participants. The second panel also displays time-varying characteristics of spells. In 
principle, the periodicity of the SIPP allows the time-varying characteristics to be updated every month. 
However, updating this information requires one record per spell; monthly updating would have produced 
roughly 300,000 records. To reduce the number of records with time-varying data, the analysis only updated 
these characteristics in the fourth month of every wave; this produced just under 80,000 time-varying, within- 
spell records. The numbers listed at the bottom of the table show the total number of time-varying records for 
each spell type. 
 
Welfare policy parameters 
The decision to receive welfare will depend on the level of benefits as well as other rules that affect eligibility. 
These will vary by state and over time. For benefits, we use the maximum benefit available for a family of three 
(Committee on Ways and Means, various years), deflated to 1992 dollars using the CPI-U. We choose a 
measure that does not vary by family size in order to avoid potential endogeneity of benefits based on fertility. 
 
The remaining welfare policy parameters are indicators of specific rules. States experimented with many rule 
changes using waivers of federal policy up through 1996 when the PRWORA was passed. These waivers were 
adopted by different states at different times allowing us to identify their effects. TANF was also implemented 
at different times in different states, although within a narrow 14-month time window. We use information on 
waiver adoption and TANF adoption primarily from the US Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) (1997) and Crouse (1999). The DHHS formed the waivers into main groups and determined when 
these were adopted statewide. Our measures include whether a state adopted any major waiver or whether it 
adopted specific waivers for a total lifetime limit on benefits (a termination limit), a reduced time limit before 
work was required (work time limit), reduced benefits for children who were conceived while the mother was 
on welfare (family cap), increased sanctions for failure to participate in the JOBS program or a reduction in the 
age of the youngest child for which the mother was required to participate in JOBS (JOBS sanctions), and more 
generous earned income disregards (earnings disregard). 
 
We also used information on whether the state had relaxed rules for eligibility for the AFDC-UP program for 
married couples and whether a state had adopted a rule requiring teenage mothers to coreside with parents in 
order to receive benefits (the information on teenage coresidence requirements come from the Urban Institute’s 
Welfare Rules Database). Finally, we defined an indicator for whether the state had implemented TANF. All of 
these indicators are time varying, with a value of zero prior to adoption and one thereafter based on the month 
and year of adoption. 
 
Table 1 shows that a sizable amount of our observed spell time occurs after the adoption of some type of 
welfare waiver. In other work (Fitzgerald & Ribar 2004), we experimented with other variations on dating the 
waivers such as using implementation rather than adoption dates and using lags. Our overall results did not 
change substantially. 
 
Besides welfare policy, we also include a variable that measures the generosity of the EITC. The EITC is a 
transfer that subsidizes earnings for low-wage workers and thus, interacts indirectly with welfare. The EITC 
was expanded substantially in the 1990s; several states have also adopted similar credits into their own income 
tax codes. The changes at the federal and state levels produce time series and cross-section variation in the 
value of the credit. We include a variable that measures the maximum combined federal and state credit for a 
family with two or more children, in 1992 dollars. The state EITC information was compiled by Nick Johnson 
at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
 
Local labor and marriage markets 
To measure job prospects, we impute county-level measures of skill- specific wages and employment 
probabilities by extending the work of Ribar (2003). In his work, Ribar constructed such measures for all 
counties from 1989 to 1997. He combined data from the Sample Edited Detail File (SEDF) of the 1990 
Decennial Census and the 1990–1998 Annual Demographic files of the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
together with industry wage and employment information from the Regional Economic Information System 
(REIS). In order to identify county of residence and work, he used the internal/confidential versions of the 
SEDF and CPS by special arrangement with the Census Bureau. He estimated wages and probabilities of 
employment based on CPS and SEDF data on personal characteristics from those files as well as local 
employment and earnings measures from REIS. The selection-corrected wage regressions included county fixed 
effects and calendar time effects. We use these coefficients together with updated information from the REIS to 
impute wages and employment probabilities for women based on their county, education, age, and race over the 
period 1989–2000. We deflate earnings by the CPI-U. Table 1 shows the mean values. Predicted wages and 
employment are smaller for the non-headship samples because of the lower average age of persons in those 
spells. 
 
Since demographic decisions would be expected to depend on spouse availability, we construct a coarse 
measure of marriage market conditions. We use the ratio of men to women aged 15–39 in a county. Separate 
ratios were constructed for blacks, Hispanics and non-blacks using annual data from the 1990 decennial census 
and the intercensal county population estimates. Small samples in some counties led to lopsided numbers so we 
trim ratios that exceeded 5 or were less than 0.2 to those values. 
 
Econometric specification 
The study estimates hazard models of transitions from and into female headship and transitions from and into 
welfare participation. The transitions from female headship are specified to depend on welfare participation. 
The study applies Lillard’s (1993) simultaneous hazards procedure to address problems of unobserved 
heterogeneity in all of the transition models and to account for the endogeneity of welfare participation in the 
headship model. The econometric specification is discussed in more detail below. 
 




The hazard, hH(t), represents the probability of exiting female headship at month t conditional on having 
remained a head until at least t. In Equation (1), TH(t) represents a vector of duration parameters; P(t) is a time-
varying indicator for welfare participation; X(t) is a vector of other observed and possibly time-varying 
covariates; η is an unobserved, person-specific variable, and AH, γ, and BH are coefficients. The first term on the 
right hand side of Equation (1), AH' TH(t) is specified to be a linear spline in the spell duration. With this 
assumption, the hazard function has a piece-wise Gompertz specification. 
 
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard function is a substantial complication. Failure to 
account for such heterogeneity can lead to biased estimates of the coefficients (for instance, spurious indications 
of negative duration dependence). Following Lillard (1993), the study assumes that η is normally distributed 
with mean 0 and variance   
  and uses a maximum likelihood procedure that accounts for the distribution of 
headship spells under this assumption. The procedure is similar to the one developed by Butler and Moffitt 
(1982) for random-effect panel probit models in that it specifies the hazard function conditional on η and then 
integrates over the distribution and possible values of η. 
 
Another complication is the endogenity of welfare participation. This problem is addressed by estimating 
models of headship and welfare participation jointly and allowing the unobserved determinants of these 
outcomes to be correlated. 
 
Along with the model for exits from female headship, the study also estimates a model of the timing of entry 
into headship (exits from non-headship). The log hazard for this outcome is specified as 
 
 
where TNH(t) is a vector of duration parameters, X(t) and η are defined as before, and ANH, BNH, and λNH are 
coefficients. As with Equation (1), the log hazard for a spell of non-headship is specified as a piece-wise 
Gompertz distribution. The analysis allows for multiple, alternating spells of both headship and non-headship. 
 
As Equations (1) and (2) indicate, a single unobserved factor is the source of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
hazard models for headship and non-headship. The coefficient λNH in Equation (2) relaxes the distribution 
somewhat. Without the coefficient (i.e., with λNH = 1), the sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the headship 
and non-headship models would be restricted to have the same variances and be perfectly, positively correlated. 
With the coefficient, the sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the two models can have different variances 
and be either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated. While the single factor assumption clearly 
restricts the correlation between the sources of heterogeneity, it is adopted for reasons of tractability. 
 
The log hazard functions for spells of welfare participation and non-participation are specified as 
 
 
where TW(t) and TNW(t) are vectors of duration parameters, Z(t) is a vector of observed covariates, it is an 
unobserved, person-specific variable, and AW, ANW, ΨW, ΨNM, and λNH are coefficients, The unobserved 
variable µ is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance   
 . It is also assumed to be 
correlated with η (correlation coefficient ρ). The hazard equations for welfare participation and non- 
participation are only estimated during spells of headship; thus, they are conditioned on being a female head. 
 
The four log hazard models are estimated jointly as a single system using the aML software package. The aML 
package employs Gaussian quadrature – a numerical approximation procedure – to evaluate the integrals over 
the two sources of unobserved heterogeneity. This study reports estimates from models that used eight 
quadrature points in each dimension, or 64 points total. Initial tests revealed that there were no noticeable 
differences in results between models that used six and eight points in each dimension. 
 
Estimation results 
Each of the models for female headship and welfare participation includes a piecewise linear specification for a 
baseline hazard. Preliminary models were estimated to determine the elements that would be included in TH(t), 
TNH(t), TW(t) and TNW(t)–that is, to find the locations of the knots, or connections between segments, in the 
linear spline functions. To keep this initial specification search simple, the study restricted the elements of TH(t) 
and TNH(t) to be the same and restricted the elements of TW(t) and TNW(t) to be the same. Estimates from models 
with completely general duration patterns (dummy variables for each possible spell length) but no other controls 
guided the initial parameterizations of the piecewise linear baseline hazards. The study then added and deleted 
segments, checking to see whether these adjustments led to changes in the fit of the baseline models. The final 
baseline hazards for the headship and non-headship models were specified to have six segments corresponding 
to 0–3, 4–6, 7–9, 10–12, 13–30 and 31–48 months. The baseline hazards for the welfare participation and non-
participation models were specified to have three segments corresponding to 0–3, 4–6 and 7–48 months. The 




The specific elements of TW(t) and TNW(t) are T 0–3(t), T4–6(t), and T 7–48(t) = max (0, t-6). 
 
A similar procedure was employed to introduce a piecewise linear time trend into the models. The calendar time 
trend accounts for changes in national policies and socioeconomic conditions as well as differences across 
panels of the SIPP. The models for female headship and non-headship allow for different trends over the 
periods 1989–1991, 1992–1997 and 1998–2000 while the models for welfare participation and non-
participation allow for different trends over the periods 1989– 1990, 1991–1998 and 1999–2000. The 
underlying variables for the trend segments are expressed in terms of calendar months since the end of 1988. 
 
Table 2 reports coefficients for the welfare participation, welfare policy and local economic variables for three 
specifications of the system of transition models. The specifications differ in their controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The first column of Table 2 lists results from a specification that omits controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The second column lists results from a specification that includes controls for η and it but 
restricts these to be independent. The third column lists results from a specification that allows η and it to be 
correlated. For each specification, coefficients from the female headship hazard model are reported first; 
coefficients from the non-headship hazard model are reported second; coefficients from the welfare 
participation hazard model are reported third, and coefficients from the non-participation model are reported 
last. For brevity, Table 2 only reports a subset of coefficients from each model. In addition to the listed 
variables, the hazard models also include controls for race, ethnicity, age, education, metropolitan residence and 
the local sex ratio. Complete results for the specification reported in the third column of Table 2 are given in 
Appendix A. Complete results for the other specifications are available from the authors. 
 
Estimation reveals that the controls for unobserved heterogeneity are statistically significant. In particular, the 
standard deviation for η in the headship model and the factor loading on η in the non-headship model are each 
individually distinguishable from zero (the factor loading is not statistically different from one, however). The 
corresponding parameters for µ are jointly but not individually significant. The positive factor loading in the 
female headship equation indicates that those prone to short spells of headship are also prone to short spells of 
non-headship. Thus, η appears to be associated with family instability generally. A similar interpretation applies 
to the coefficient in the welfare model, though this coefficient is insignificant. In the third specification, the 
correlation coefficient ρ is significantly negative. This indicates that characteristics that contribute to instability 
in living arrangements are associated with longer and more stable welfare program arrangements. Because 
specification tests reject the restrictions in the first two specifications, the discussion of empirical findings will 
focus on the coefficients from the third (least restrictive) specification. We note, however, 
 
that the coefficients reported in Table 2 are not especially sensitive to the use of controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
Welfare participation is estimated to reduce the hazard of exiting female headship – that is, contribute to longer 
spells of headship. The estimated relationship is consistent with expectations and stronger than the preliminary 
results reported by Teitler et al. (2003). Estimates of the association between welfare participation and headship 
that account for correlations in the unobserved determinants in these outcomes are 10– 15% smaller than 
estimates that do not account for such correlations. Thus correcting for correlated heterogeneity makes a modest 
difference in the results. 
 
Among the welfare policy variables, more generous welfare benefits are estimated to hasten unmarried mothers’ 
participation in welfare. Benefits are also estimated to reduce exits from the welfare rolls, though the coefficient 
falls just below the threshold for statistical significance (two-tailed p value = 0.108). The coefficients for the 
welfare benefit variables are small and insignificant in the hazard models for headship and non-headship. Taken 
together, the estimates indicate that welfare benefits contribute indirectly to female headship by increasing 
welfare participation; however, there is no strong evidence of any additional direct association once 
participation is taken into account. None of the coefficients for the waiver variables is statistically different 
from zero. The weak results for waivers are consistent with our earlier findings for headship (Fitzgerald and 
Ribar, 2004) and welfare participation (Ribar 2004). 
 
More generous benefits under the EITC are associated with longer spells of all four outcomes: headship, non-
headship, participation and non-participation. Thus, the EITC appears to contribute to stability in both living 
and program arrangements. The finding that the EITC is associated with longer welfare spells is surprising but 
may reflect the subsidy allowing mothers to combine welfare and work careers. Previous research by Meyer & 
Rosenbaum (2001) indicated that the expansions in the EITC increased work but reduced welfare receipt, while 
research by Dickert-Conlin & Houser (1999) indicated that the subsidy reduced headship. Better economic 
opportunities in the respondent’s county of residence in the form of higher average wages for women of the 
same age, race and schooling attainment significantly reduce the probability of exiting headship but also reduce 
the chances of entering welfare. The findings suggest that wage opportunities contribute to women’s financial 
independence. The study’s other measure of economic opportunities, the local skill-specific employment 
probability, is estimated to be positively associated with welfare exits. 
 
The coefficients for the other observed variables (shown in Appendix A) either have the expected signs or are 
insignificant. In particular, women of African and Hispanic origin are generally estimated to have higher risks 
of headship and welfare participation than other women. The hazard for entry into female headship rises with 
age through age 18 then falls with age. The hazard for exiting headship increases with age, while the hazard for 
entering welfare falls with age. Higher levels of education help women avoid both headship and welfare 
participation. The hazards of exiting headship, non-headship and welfare participation increase with duration 
during the first three months of a spell. All four hazards generally decrease with duration after 4 months. The 
coefficients on the trend variables indicate that all four hazards were falling in the late 1990s. 
 
Table 3 reports welfare participation, welfare policy and economic condition coefficients from three alternative 
specifications of the system of transition models. One issue that the study examines more carefully is whether 
the welfare policy variables have any independent effect on the duration of female headship once welfare 
participation is taken into account. The estimates from Table 2 indicate that the benefit level affects headship 
through welfare participation but that there are no additional independent effects of either the benefit level or 
waiver policies. The first column in Table 3 lists results from a specification that omits the welfare benefit and 
waiver variables from the headship equation. Other than these two exclusions, the specification includes all of 
the observed variables and statistical controls as the third specification from Table 2 (i.e., is nested within the 
previous specification). Thus, it can be used to test the joint significance of the policy variables in the headship 
model and examine the sensitivity of the welfare participation coefficient to their inclusion or exclusion. 
Comparisons across tables indicate that there is only a small change in the log likelihood function and no 
noticeable change in the coefficient for welfare participation, thus confirming our interpretation. 
 
The second column in Table 3 lists results from a specification that adds an indicator for the implementation of 
TANF to each of the four hazard models. Most states had reformed their welfare programs through the Section 
1115 waiver process by the end of 1996; however, as a result of the PRWORA all states were subsequently 
required to implement TANF programs. In some states, the TANF programs followed the general contours of 
the waiver provisions. In other states, TANF represented a substantial change in direction or the actual start of 
the reform process. Including indicators for both waiver adoption and TANF implementation provides a more 
complete description of 
 
 
reform efforts and allows for differences between waiver and TANF policies. The estimated coefficients for 
TANF, however, are all statistically weak, and a likelihood ratio test indicates that they are jointly insignificant. 
The strongest result appears in the hazard model for non- participation. The coefficient suggests that TANF may 
have slowed and reduced entry into welfare, but the p value is only 0.175. 
 
The third specification replaces the single indicator for adopting any type of welfare waiver with seven separate 
indicators for different types of waivers. It is reasonable to expect that some types of waivers might have 
stronger or weaker effects, or possibly even differently signed effects, on headship and participation outcomes. 
The third specification allows for such effects but at the potential expense of a loss of statistical power if the 
policies are closely related or only implemented in a few locations. Estimation reveals that few of the individual 
waiver indicators are statistically significant (only four coefficients out of the 28 entered into the models). Of 
the coefficients that are significant, most have counter-intuitive signs. For instance, teen coresidence 
requirements are associated with faster entry into headship, and term limits are associated with longer spells on 
welfare. The results provide little support for the hypothesis that waiver provisions played a meaningful role in 
the stabilization of headship rates or in the decline in welfare participation. 
 
Conclusion 
This study draws individual-level data on spells of female headship, non-headship, welfare participation, non-
participation from several panels of the SIPP. Through an arrangement with the U.S. Census Bureau, we use 
special versions of the SIPP that allow us to link these data with state-level indicators of welfare policies and 
county-level measures of economic and marriage opportunities. The study uses the combined data to estimate 
hazard models of the four spell outcomes. The estimation procedure accounts for correlated sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants of spell lengths. The procedure also allows the study to consider 
welfare participation as an endogenous determinant of female headship spells. 
 
Estimates from the hazard models indicate that welfare participation is significantly, negatively associated with 
the probability of leaving headship. This association is robust in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical 
significance to the use of controls for endogeneity. The finding is consistent with welfare participation directly 
contributing to longer spells of female headship. While the evidence regarding causality is stronger than that 
reported in some previous studies, it is not definitive because the study’s statistical methodology only accounts 
for endogeneity that arises from unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of people and relies on relatively 
strong assumptions regarding the distribution of these unobserved characteristics. 
 
The study finds that the chances that an unmarried mother will enroll in welfare increase with the level of 
benefits offered by her state of residence. There is also weak evidence that benefits encourage unmarried 
mothers to remain on welfare. More generous benefits are indirectly associated with longer spells of female 
headship through their association with welfare participation. The study does not find evidence that benefits 
have an additional, direct impact on headship, once the effect through welfare participation is taken into 
account. Other welfare policies, as measured by the adoption of program waivers and the implementation of 
TANF, are not strongly associated with female headship or welfare participation. Thus, aside from changes in 
benefits, it does not appear that reforms enacted during the 1990s contributed substantially to the stabilization of 
headship rates or the reduction in welfare caseloads. 
 
A strength of this study is its use of skill-specific, county-level controls for wage and employment 
opportunities. Higher wages are associated with longer spells of female headship as well as longer spells off 
welfare. These results, along with like-signed estimates for EITC benefits, suggest that earnings contribute to 
women’s economic independence – both from potential husbands and from the welfare system. 
 
Some limitations of the study should also be kept in mind in interpreting the results. The biggest limitation is 
the short observational window available in the SIPP. In no instance could the study examine headship or 
welfare participation spells that lasted more than 4 years. Shorter time frames for some panels, attrition from the 
surveys, and the study’s exclusion of initially on-going (left-censored) spells further limited the number of 
transitions that could be examined. While the breadth of coverage makes the SIPP a logical choice for 
examining welfare policies, surveys with a greater length of coverage, such as the PSID, should also be 
considered in future work. Other limitations of the study include the strong parametric assumptions in the 
hazard functions and the complexity of the estimation methods. Despite these limitations, we are confident that 
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Note 
1. Some studies, however, document that bad marriage situations may be worse for children than single 
parenthood (Amato et al. 1995; Hofferth & Anderson 2003; Jekielek 1998; Morrison & Coiro 1999). 
Deleire & Kalil (2002) argue that single- parent multigenerational families can be beneficial. Further, 
Amato’s (1993) review of the literature notes that many studies find insignificiant associations between 
family structure and child well being. 
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